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This paper documents the presence of systematic bias in the real GDP and inflation 
forecasts of private sector forecasters in the G7 economies in the years 1990–2005. The 
data come from the monthly Consensus Economics forecasting service, and bias is mea-
sured and tested for significance using parametric fixed effect panel regressions and 
nonparametric tests on accuracy ranks. We examine patterns across countries and fore-
casters to establish whether the bias reflects the inefficient use of information, or 
whether it reflects a rational response to financial, reputational and other incentives op-
erating for forecasters. In several G7 countries – Japan, Italy, Germany and France – 
there is evidence of a change in the trend growth rate. In these circumstances, standard 
tests for rationality are inappropriate, and a bias towards optimism in the consensus fo-
recast is inevitable as rational forecasters learn about the new trend. In all countries the-
re is evidence that individual forecasters converge on the consensus forecast too slowly. 
However, the persistent optimism of some forecasters, and the persistent pessimism of 
others, is not consistent with the predictions of models of “rational bias” that have be-
come popular in the finance and economics literature. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Why would a forecaster publish persistently biased forecasts? There are three 
possible explanations. One is that the forecaster lacks the skill to utilize information 
efficiently, and fails to learn from past forecast errors. A second is that the forecaster 
has the skill to utilize information “rationally”, but insufficient data to learn about 
which changes in the target variable are permanent and which are transitory.  The 
third possibility is that the forecaster has skill and sufficient data, but willfully 
introduces “rational bias” in response to financial or reputational incentives to make 
an optimistic or pessimistic forecast. Our aim in this paper is to review explanations 
for bias in forecasts, and particularly forecasts of the macro-economy.  These theories 
are then evaluated for consistency with stylized facts about the performance of private 
sector forecasts of real GDP growth and inflation in the G7 economies in the years 
1990–2005.  
The background to the study is a series of papers written in the early 1990s 
documenting a number of regularities in the behaviour of a panel of US economic 
forecasters contributing to the Blue Chip consensus forecasting service in the US in 
the 1980s. Batchelor and Dua (1990a) surveyed their forecasting methods. A key 
finding was that most forecasters placed at least as much weight on judgment as on 
formal econometric modelling. Forecasters exercising a balance of modelling and 
judgment were generally more accurate than the small number of model-only and 
judgment-only forecasters. We did not explore exactly how judgment was exercised. 
However, Batchelor and Dua (1990b) found that individual forecasters tended to 
consistently adopt either an initially optimistic or an initially pessimistic view of the 
economy 1-2 years ahead. In the context of the US economy, this is unlikely to be due 
to bias in model forecasts, but more likely reflects judgmental manipulation. 
Batchelor and Dua (1992a) further showed that most forecasters were conservative in 
making revisions to predictions of growth, unemployment, inflation and interest rates 
for a fixed target year. Forecasters underutilised recent economic information, and did 
not shrink their individual forecasts towards the previously published average or 
“consensus” forecast sufficiently. This sluggish reaction to news meant that initial 
optimism or pessimism rankings also persisted at shorter horizons. In spite of this, 
over a run of years there was little to choose between forecasters in terms of accuracy,   2
and forecasts were generally unbiased, since large variations in the target variables 
meant that sometimes the optimists proved to be closer to the truth, and sometimes the 
pessimists were.   
One interpretation of these findings is that forecasters were producing technically 
irrational forecasts because of behavioural biases in the information processing – 
specifically anchoring and conservatism – as documented by Kahneman and Tversky 
(1973). Batchelor and Dua (1990b) suggested an alternative explanation which is 
consistent with rational behaviour in a market where forecasters compete to sell their 
services. The biases to optimism and pessimism were attempts by forecasters to 
“brand” their products, and the failure to converge towards the consensus reflected 
this product differentiation.  
Since then, many papers have recognised that forecasters operate in markets, and 
are subject to incentives of various kinds that might bias their predictions even if 
information is processed rationally. These typically lead to models where the utility 
(to the forecaster) of the forecast is either an asymmetric function of the forecast 
error, or a function of additional factors such as optimism, consistency, or 
newsworthiness. A few of these papers have looked at macroeconomic forecasters, 
but most focus on analysts’ forecasts of company earnings and stock prices, where 
there are rich time series and cross-sectional databases, and some very obvious 
reasons for analysts to make biased predictions. There are some similarities in the 
environments in which macroeconomists and stock market analysts work, but there 
are significant differences too. Section 2 of the paper below sets out a framework for 
analyzing forecast bias, and reviews the finance and economics literature on rational 
bias. 
Section 3 introduces more recent data on real GDP and inflation forecasts. These 
are taken from the Consensus Economics forecasting service, which has published 
macroeconomic forecasts since 1989 of various private sector bodies – banks, 
corporations, industry associations, consultancy firms, research institutes, and 
universities – operating in all G7 economies. This gives us the opportunity to update 
the earlier US studies, and extend them to other major economies. The experience of 
the G7 countries in the 1990s has been challenging for forecasters, with the US, 
Canada and the UK experiencing healthy growth, France and Italy experiencing some   3
slowdown, Japan trapped in a state of almost permanent recession, Germany subject 
to the shock of unification, and inflation everywhere falling to very low and 
sometimes negative levels.  
Bias in these forecasts is measured and tested for significance using parametric 
fixed effect panel regressions, and nonparametric tests of accuracy ranks. Two results 
stand out. First, we replicate the Batchelor and Dua (1990b) finding that individual 
forecasters appear to cultivate reputations for relative optimism or pessimism in real 
GDP forecasts in all countries, and consequently converge too slowly on the 
consensus forecast. This is not consistent with the predictions of models of “rational 
bias” that have become popular in the finance and economics literature, which predict 
excessive “herding” and excessive dispersion of forecasts, respectively, but not 
consistent bias at the individual level.  Second, in some countries we also find 
evidence of bias toward optimism even in the average “consensus” forecast. However, 
this occurs in Japan, Italy, Germany and France, and to a lesser extent Canada, where 
in all cases there is evidence of a downward shift in the trend growth rate. In these 
circumstances standard tests for rationality are inappropriate, and a bias towards 
optimism in the consensus forecast does not reflect “behavioural” manipulation, but is 
inevitable as rational forecasters gradually learn about the new trend.  
 
2. Rational Bias 
 
To frame our discussion of the sources of bias, and to motivate the later empirical 
tests, consider the following scenario. In month t a forecaster i publishes a forecast of 
the value of some key variable y, such as real GDP growth. The true value of y will be 
revealed at target date T, so the horizon of the forecast can be regarded as h = T-t. The 
forecast published in month t we denote as fit,T. If the initial forecast is made in month 
τ, the maximum horizon is T – τ, and the initial forecast is denoted fiτ,T. 
The information set Ωit of the forecaster at t can be partitioned into three 
components:  
-  the forecast made by forecaster i last month, fit-1,T 
-  the consensus (average) forecast of all forecasters last month, ft-1,T 
-  other news arriving during month t, summarised into a point forecast git,T     4
If y is normally distributed, the statistical expected value f*it,T will minimise the 
expected mean squared error E(yT –fit,T)
2. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that 
this is a weighted average of the three inputs: 
 
  f*it,T = E{yT | Ωit} =  α*i fit-1,T + β*i ft-1,T + γ*i git,T (1) 
 
The initial forecast is made without reference to past forecasts, but it is helpful to 
think of it as a weighted average of a forecast based on cumulative relevant 
information up to τ, say Giτ,T, and a conjectured initial consensus forecast Fτ,T, formed 
on the basis of the public information in Ωiτ.  
In the terminology of Muth (1960), these forecasts are “rational expectations” of 
the target variable. Provided that the underlying process driving the target variable is 
stable, characteristics of rational expectations are unbiasedness, orthogonality of the 
forecast errors with respect to components of the information set, and serially 
uncorrelated forecast revisions. These form the basis of many empirical tests of 
“rationality” in published forecasts. 
The empirical studies of forecaster behaviour reviewed below suggest that in 
practice forecasters do have incentives to publish forecasts that minimise the expected 
squared error, but also may be consistently biased to optimism or pessimism, either 
overweight or underweight the consensus (and by implication underweight news), and 
minimise forecast revisions. 
 
This implies that the forecaster faces a utility maximisation problem of the form 
 
 max  Uit,T = - E(yT –fit,T)
2 + a(fit,T - fit-1,T)
2+ b(fit,T – ft-1,T)
2  (2) 
 
The first term is the squared error, the minimand assumed by conventional theory, and 
programmed into most econometric models. The second term is the change in the 
individual forecast from one month to the next. Here we expect weight a on the 
forecast revision to be negative, since there are benefits to “conservatism”. The third 
term is the gap between the individual forecast and the latest consensus forecast. The 
weight  b on this term could be either positive or negative depending on whether   5
forecasters benefit from “product differentiation”, or from “herding” towards the 
consensus.  
First order conditions for a maximum imply that the forecaster will publish a 
forecast of   
 
  fit,T = αi fit-1,T + βi ft-1,T + γi git,T <> f*it,T , (3) 
  
where αi = (α*i - a)/(1 - a - b), βi = (β*i - b)/(1 - a - b),  and γi = γ*i /(1 - a - b). 
Without loss of generality we can constrain the weights to (α*i + β*i + γ*i) = 1 in (1), 
so that (αi + βi + γi) = 1. The analytics of (3) are then straightforward. If forecasters 
are conservative (a < 0) and “herd” (b < 0), then αi > α
∗
i, βi > β*i, and necessarily γi < 
γ*i, so that news is underweighted. If forecasters are conservative (a < 0) and try to 
differentiate their product by underweighting the consensus (b > 0), then αi > α
∗
i, βi < 
β*i   and news is overweighted or underweighted (γi > γ*i or < γ*i) according as (a + 
b) > 0 or < 0. 
Differences between the published forecast and the error minimizing forecast 
therefore arise from three sources – the initial bias to optimism or pessimism 
introduced by the forecaster, conservatism in forecast revision, and over- or under-
weighting of the consensus forecast. We discuss each in turn. 
 
2.1 Optimism  
We use the terms “optimistic” and “pessimistic” as a convenient shorthand to refer 
to forecasts of the real GDP that prove too high, and forecasts of inflation that prove 
too low. So long as there is a penalty for forecast revisions, the influence of the initial 
forecast will be excessive, and any bias to optimism or pessimism in the initial 
forecast will be propagated forward into the whole series of forecasts for target date T. 
There are three ways that the initial forecast can be biased.  
First, a forecaster whose initial information set by chance implies an optimistic 
forecast will be optimistic for too long, and vice versa. Over a run of successive 
monthly forecasts for a single target year this will cause bias. However, since it is 
unlikely that a forecaster will by chance receive consistently optimistic or pessimistic 
information year after year, this is unlikely to cause forecasts to appear biased over a   6
long run of years. Bias due to differences in individual information sets will also 
disappear when averaged over individuals, and so will not induce bias in the 
consensus forecast.  
Second, Batchelor and Dua (1990b) suggest that there are benefits to forecasters 
of cultivating a reputation as optimists or pessimists.  
Forecasting bodies affiliated with governments have several reasons to make 
biased forecasts, which we could classify as “instrumental”, “indicative”, and 
“partisan”. The forecast may be used as an instrument to rationalize a particular policy 
stance. Heinemann (2005) shows that official medium term projections of economic 
growth in Germany have been persistently optimistic for several decades, allowing 
governments to make spending plans on the basis of unrealistically high projections of 
tax receipts. Jonung and Larch (2006) show that over-optimism has also characterized 
more recent budget projections in Italy and France, though not those of the UK. The 
forecast may also be used as a tool to stimulate some private sector behaviour. For 
example, in the era of “indicative planning” (Estrin & Holmes, 1990), governments – 
notably in France and Japan, and for a short period the UK – consciously promulgated 
optimistic forecasts in the belief that this would generate private investment, and 
perhaps even validate the forecast. Official inflation forecasts are generally close to 
official inflation targets, which are designed in the same way to moderate wage 
settlements and pricing decisions by the private sector. Finally the forecast may 
simply be used to put the incumbent party of government in a favourable light. Ulan, 
Dewald and Bullard (1995), for example, show that US administration forecasts for 
the US in the 1980s were typically optimistic, while their forecasts for other countries 
were unbiased. 
Private sector forecasters also have incentives to bias their figures towards 
optimism or pessimism. Some forecasters or users of forecasts may support the 
incumbent government and its policies, and prefer to cite optimistic forecasts. Others 
may oppose current policy, and prefer to cite pessimistic forecasts. Forecasters may 
bend their predictions to make their forecasts more attractive to particular client 
groups. Trades union may have incentives to seek out forecasters that produce 
relatively pessimistic inflation forecasts. Business associations may seek out 
forecasters who make predictions that would support their programs for, say,   7
industrial subsidies, tariff protection or exchange rate devaluation. In addition to 
pressure from clients, forecasters may have their own reasons to introduce bias. 
Forecasts are typically produced jointly with comments on economic policy. If a 
forecaster writes a newsletter or book predicting the death of inflation or an imminent 
economic collapse he/she is committed to making consistently optimistic or 
pessimistic statements for some years thereafter, just to maintain credibility, speaking 
fees and book sales. 
This implies that the initial forecast is not a weighted average of the conjectured 
consensus forecast and an information based forecast, but the conjectured consensus 
plus or minus some add-factor. Bias from this source will not disappear when 
averaged over target years. However, it will disappear when averaged over 
forecasters, since some will necessarily be optimistic and some pessimistic relative to 
the average, consensus, forecast. 
Third, in certain circumstances, it may be optimal for all forecasters to introduce a 
bias towards optimism. Consider Figure 1, which shows successive series of monthly 
forecasts of earnings of the companies in the Standard & Poor’s 500 stock index for 
the target years 1990-2006. The earnings forecasts are aggregated from forecasts for 
the individual companies, each made by several analysts. Like the Consensus 
Economics forecasts, these predictions start two years before the end of the target 
year, so analysts make a series of 24 monthly forecasts for each target year. The 
dotted lines in the figure join the series of forecasts for each target year, and the firm 
lines show the 12-month ahead forecasts, and the actual outcomes. In all but the most 
recent years (and possibly 1995 when forecasts were flat), the forecasts show a 
consistent “walkdown” profile. The initial earnings forecast is between 10% and 50% 
too optimistic. Then as the months pass, this is gradually revised down towards the 
realized level. Because the initial optimism does not disappear under aggregation, it 
cannot be due to product differentiation activity (which would cause some analysts to 
produce higher and some lower forecasts than the consensus). The generalized bias 
suggests that there are some incentives operating on all analysts that caused them to 
make excessively optimistic earnings forecasts.  
Some commentators have argued that this bias is illusory, the result of a skewed 
distribution of analyst forecasts which are mostly unbiased but with a few extreme   8
outliers, and it is true that median forecasts are less biased and converge faster than 
mean forecasts (Brown, 2001; Richardson, Teoh & Wysocki, 2004). Some 
commentators argue that the bias is due to self-selection by analysts, who for career 
satisfaction gravitate to sectors and companies that they perceive as having relatively 
good prospects (McNichols & O’Brien, 1997). However, Butler and Lang (1991) find 
biases to pessimism as well as optimism among individual analysts. Others have more 
plausibly suggested that optimism benefits analysts by building relationships with the 
target companies, and leads to more access to people and information (Francis & 
Philbrick, 1993; Francis, Hanna & Philbrick, 1997; Lim, 2001). Another possibility is 
that optimistic forecasts generate trades, since the investment funds that are the main 
clients of analysts are typically looking for reasons to buy shares in one company 
rather than another. As is consistent with this idea, forecasts from banks with business 
relationships with target firms tend to be more optimistic than forecasts from 
disinterested forecasters (Dechow, Hutton & Sloan, 2000). It also appears that 
analysts’ promotion prospects inside a firm are related to forecast optimism (Hong & 
Kubik, 2003). 
Although it is clearly relevant to financial analysts, this generalised bias to 
optimism does not apply obviously to economic forecasters. Even for US equity 
analysts the environment is changing. The collapse of Enron in 2001 and Worldcom 
in 2002 led to high profile prosecutions of analysts found to be boosting shares, and 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act which inter alia requires US companies to make accurate and 
transparent public statements about projected earnings. It may not be fanciful to 
attribute the excessive moderation in analyst forecasts after 2002 to this new set of 
incentives, which on the one hand penalises excessive optimism in company 
announcements, and on the other hand makes a higher quality stream of company data 
available to all forecasters equally. 
 
2.2 Conservatism 
There are three reasons why forecasters might apparently give excessive weight to 
their own past forecasts.  First, the studies collected in Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky 
(1982) suggest strongly that in making judgments with imperfect information, 
individuals are subject to biases in the way information is used. Specifically, they tend   9
to be overconfident about the likely accuracy of their own forecasts, and they tend to 
anchor subsequent forecasts on readily available information, often regardless of its 
relevance. Taken together, these cognitive failures are liable to lead forecasters to 
overweight their own past forecasts, and underreact to news, including other 
forecasters’ predictions (Kahneman & Tversky, 1973).    
Second, conservatism in forecast revisions might reflect reputation-building 
through consistency, of a kind discussed earlier. Ehrbeck and Waldeman (1996) argue 
that forecasters attempt to create credibility by mimicking the characteristics of good 
forecasters. One characteristic popularly attributed to good forecasters (though not by 
Ehrbeck & Waldeman) is that they do not have to revise their forecasts as much as 
bad forecasters. So a bad forecaster can try to look good by being consistent. 
Third, if the underlying process driving the target variable is not stable, it is 
rational for error-minimising forecasters to make serially correlated forecast revisions, 
and systematic forecast errors, as they learn about changes in the process. A 
reasonable model for many economic variables is that they consist of a permanent but 
time-varying component z, say, and a transitory component u, so that: 
 
  zt = zt-1+ vt   vt ~ N(0, ρ 
2) (4)
 y t = zt  + ut   ut ~ N(0, σ 
2)  (5) 
 
where cov(ut, vt) = 0. In this set-up, the news based forecast gt is the latest observation 
yt.  As shown by Muth (1960), the error-minimising forecast of y at some future fixed 
target date T is the single exponential smoothing model: 
 
  f*t, T = λ yt +  (1- λ) f*t-1, T   (6) 
 
where λ = ρ
2/ (ρ
2 + σ
2). That is, forecasts are gradually adjusted in response to new 
observations on y, with the speed of response λ depending on the relative variance of 
permanent and transitory changes in y. When a change in the permanent component of 
the target variable occurs, adjustment in rational forecasts does not occur 
instantaneously. There is a learning period with a half-life of 1/λ during which 
forecasters determine whether the observed change in the target variable is transitory   10
or permanent. Forecast revisions, and errors in these adaptive forecasts, will not be 
serially uncorrelated, and forecasts will appear biased as a result of the time taken to 
learn about permanent changes. 
 
2.3 Herding 
Forecasters in financial markets overweight the forecasts of other forecasters, 
leading to the phenomenon of “herding”, or excessive concentration of earnings 
forecasts. Herding is also observed in the behaviour of fund managers, who tend to 
make portfolio decisions that are similar to those of other managers. Returns to 
professionally managed investment funds are consequently less dispersed than would 
be expected by chance. And buying and selling by some managers of, say, 
investments in technology shares or investments in Thailand, is liable to trigger 
market bubbles or collapses as others imitate their behaviour. The voluminous 
academic literature on herding in finance is surveyed in Bickchandani and Sharma 
(2001).  
There are two main theories of how rational herding can arise. The “information 
cascade” theory posits that forecasts are made sequentially by different agents, and so 
as each forecast is published it becomes part of the next forecaster’s information set. 
Later forecasts are therefore biased towards the early forecasts, as is the consensus 
itself. Graham (1999), for example, finds relationships in published forecasts in runs 
of investment newsletters. The “incentive concavity” theory assumes that the rewards 
for making an accurate but “bold” (i.e. away from the consensus) forecast are smaller 
than the penalties for an inaccurate bold forecast. According to Lamont (2002), one 
prediction of this theory is that less experienced forecasters herd more since their 
career prospects are at stake. He finds that in a group of US forecasters publishing in 
Business Week, the less experienced do indeed produce fewer extreme predictions. 
However, Pons-Novell (2003) finds no tendency for inexperienced forecasters in the 
long-running US Livingston survey to herd on the consensus, and if anything, Stark 
(1997) finds the opposite result when the same tests are conducted on the well-known 
FRB Philadelphia Survey of Professional Forecasters data set. Applying Lamont’s 
model to forecasts made by economists in Japan, Ashiya and Doi (2001) similarly 
find no relationship between age and divergence from the consensus. In any case, it is   11
unclear that the incentive to be bold increases with age. In Prendergast and Stole 
(1996), for example, it is the “impetuous youngsters” who make bold decisions and 
the “jaded old-timers” who conform. 
Whereas herding appears to be the rule in financial forecasting, all research on 
economic forecasting finds that forecasters underweight the consensus. We have 
noted that in the model of Ehrbeck and Waldeman (1996), forecasters try to achieve 
credibility by mimicking the behaviour of good forecasters. The hypothesis that they 
test is that, because the consensus is known to be a good forecast, bad forecasters will 
herd on the consensus. However, using data from the Blue Chip Economic Indicators 
panel they find exactly the opposite, confirming the earlier results of Batchelor and 
Dua (1992b) on the same survey.  
To rationalise these findings, Laster, Bennett and Geoum (1999) develop a model 
in which there are two users of forecasts: regular users, who know the whole track 
record of the forecaster, and occasional users who only register the most recent 
success or failure of the forecaster. To please regular users, forecasters would make 
predictions that have the minimum expected squared error, since these will have 
lowest mean square error over a long run of forecasts. To please occasional users, 
however, forecasters have an incentive to bias each prediction away from the 
consensus, so as to improve their chances of being the most accurate in a one-off 
contest.  In a similar vein, Ottaviani and Sorensen (2006) develop a model in which 
the rewards depend on mean square accuracy, but the rewards have to be shared with 
neighbouring forecasters. The optimal strategy for all forecasters is to move published 
forecasts a little away from their estimates of the minimum squared error prediction, 
towards the tail of the distribution of forecasts, and away from the consensus. This 
reduces the probability of winning the forecast contest, but increases the size of the 
reward.  
Both of these frameworks imply that the dispersion of economic forecasts around 
the consensus will be larger than expected if each forecasters published the variance 
minimising prediction (1). However, over a run of forecasts, each forecaster will 
appear unbiased, sometimes making exaggerated over-predictions and at other times 
exaggerated under-predictions.  
   12
3.  Data and empirical tests 
 
The Consensus Forecasts service started publishing forecasts for the G7 
economies in September 1989. Each month the service surveys a number of private 
sector forecasting bodies, normally based in the target country, and publishes tables 
showing individual forecasts and the arithmetic average or “Consensus” forecast for a 
range of macroeconomic variables. The Consensus Economics growth and inflation 
forecasts have been widely used by practitioners and researchers as a benchmark for 
official forecasts (Artis, 1996; Batchelor, 2001), and to investigate the accuracy of 
private sector forecasts (Blix et. al., 2001; Loungani, 2001; Isiklar & Lahiri, 2006; 
Lahiri & Sheng, 2006). Exchange rate forecasts collected by Consensus Economics 
have also been used to investigate forecaster behaviour; see for example, MacDonald 
and Marsh (1994, 1996) and more recently Beine, Bénassy-Quéré, and Colas (2003).   
Here we focus on their forecasts for real GDP and consumer price inflation. The 
forecasting institutions are typically international or national banks, business 
corporations, trade associations, or research institutes. The number of institutions 
surveyed differs across countries. There are typically 25-30 forecasters making 
predictions for the US, and maybe 15-20 for Italy.  Responses also change from 
month to month within countries, and forecasters periodically leave or join the 
service. So the composition of the panel changes a little from month to month, and 
some forecasters are regular contributors over a number of years, while others appear 
less frequently. Forecasts are made for the current year and the following year, so if 
we imagine that the actual variable is revealed in the January following the target 
year, the forecast horizon starts at 24 months, and shrinks to 1 month. Our data start 
with the January 1990 forecasts, and end with the December 2004 forecasts, giving 
predictions at all horizons for the 14 target years 1991 – 2004.  
Two issues arise when comparing these forecasts to the actual outcomes for GDP 
growth and inflation. The first is that both figures – and especially GDP growth – are 
subject to revision and rebasings. We have looked at the “preliminary” estimates of 
GDP growth and inflation, which are released early in the year following the target 
year, and recorded in the February Consensus Forecasts publications. We have also 
looked at the “final” estimate of growth and inflation published one year later (that is,   13
in February of the second year following the target year). Although there are some 
differences in error statistics depending on which measure is used, they make no 
difference to any of the inferences drawn in this study, and most of the tables and 
figures below use the final estimates.  The second issue concerns the target for the 
GDP in Germany. In surveys up to May 1997, Consensus Forecasts asked respondents 
for the future growth in both the former West Germany and Germany as a whole. We 
have followed the pattern of reporting in the electronic Consensus Forecasts database, 
and used figures for West Germany in predictions made for the years 1990-1996, and 
all Germany in the years 1997-2004.  Again, looking at the consensus figures for all 
Germany prior to 1997 suggests that this will not affect inferences about forecast 
errors.  
We measure bias using the error yT – fit,T in the forecast made at time t by 
forecaster i for variable y at target date T. This can be decomposed into the bias in the 
consensus forecast ft,T and the deviation in the individual forecast from the consensus, 
as: 
 
   yT – fit,T ≡ (yT – ft,T)  - (fit,T - ft,T)  (7) 
 
We discuss the properties of bias in the consensus, and bias in individual forecasts 
around the consensus, in turn. 
 
3.1 Bias in Consensus Forecasts 
Table 1 shows the mean and standard deviation of annual growth and inflation 
rates in the G7 economies, and the average bias in the consensus forecasts at 24-, 18-, 
12- and 6-month horizons, where bias is defined as the final outcome less the 
consensus forecast.  
In predicting growth rates, there is an obvious difference between the track record 
of forecasters in the US, and that of forecasters for the other G7 countries. On average 
the initial forecasts for US growth have shown little bias, and indeed less bias than 
forecasts at shorter horizons, though none of the figures is statistically significant. In 
all the other countries, forecasts have tended to be initially optimistic (negative bias). 
The bias in forecasts for the UK and Canada are small (0.5% or lower), and are not   14
statistically significant, though they do persist, and in the case of Canada a tendency 
to overprediction continues well into the target year. The bias in the consensus 
forecast for Japan is larger, nearly 1%, but is not consistent from year to year, and so 
is not statistically significant. The initial bias in Japan is also eradicated relatively 
quickly, and there is little evidence of bias in forecasts at horizons of less than 18 
months.  
This contrasts with the experience in forecasting the core European Union 
economies of Germany, France and Italy. In these countries, initial forecasts have 
tended to be persistently too high, so that the initial biases of around 1% are all 
statistically significant. As information accumulates, the biases are reduced 
somewhat, but much more slowly than in Japan. In the case of Italy, a statistically 
significant bias to optimism persists even in very short term 6-month forecasts. Figure 
2 shows the complete track record of the Consensus growth forecasts for Italy. The 24 
successive monthly forecasts for each target year, shown by the solid lines, show a 
walkdown pattern very similar to that exhibited by the financial analysts in Figure 1. 
In 11 out of the 15 target years, the initial consensus GDP forecast was too high, and 
was only slowly revised downwards. The pictures are similar if a little less dramatic 
for Germany and France. 
The biases in inflation forecasts are almost a mirror image of the biases in growth 
forecasts. In Germany and Italy, where the bias to optimism in real GDP forecasts is 
most pronounced, inflation forecasts have been unbiased at all horizons. In the other 
countries, the forecasts have initially been biased upwards by about 0.5%. This bias 
does not persist very long, however, and is close to zero for all countries by the 12 
month horizon. Because the biases in inflation forecasts are rather small we focus here 
on the causes of bias in the real GDP forecasts. 
A bias toward optimism can arise from incentives operating on forecasters. 
However, it is extremely unlikely that economists are subject to the same kind of 
pressures to produce optimistic forecasts as investment analysts. Also, while 
forecasters might have reasons to differentiate themselves from the consensus, this is 
unlikely to be the cause of bias in the consensus itself. Another possibility is that that 
statistics are distorted by a few outlying observations. As shown by Loungani (2001) 
and Loungani and Trehan (2002), economists are notoriously bad at forecasting   15
recessions, but are better at timing recoveries. The resulting small number of large 
overpredictions made in recession years can give an illusion of a bias to optimism in 
short data series. This does not seem to be a problem here. For example, Figure 2 
shows that Italy suffered only one year of negative growth over our data period, and 
overprediction was not confined to the worst years.  
The most likely reason for bias in the consensus forecasts of real growth is that it 
reflects errors made during the process of learning about a slowdown in the trend 
growth rates in Japan and continental Europe. In the upper panel of Table 2 we show 
growth rates by decade for the G7 economies. The US, Canada and the UK show little 
sign of a slowing in the growth rates between the 1970s, 1980s, 1990s and the early 
2000s. In contrast, the growth rate in Japan fell dramatically in the 1990s, and in 
Germany, France and Italy growth fell in the 1980s, fell further in the 1990s, and 
further still in the 2000s. The lower panel of Table 2 shows estimates of the parameter 
λ for the single exponential smoothing model of equation (6), where the target 
variable y is the change in the natural logarithm of the GDP in each country, and 
parameter estimates are based on annual data for the years 1960-2004. For the US, 
Canada and the UK, λ = 0, implying that changes in growth rates from year to year 
are transitory rather than permanent. For the other countries, λ is significantly 
positive, around 0.2 for Germany and Italy and close to 0.5 for France and Japan. In 
these countries, 20-50% of movements in growth rates represent permanent changes. 
In the final row of Table 2 we report the prediction from the smoothing model of the 
underlying growth rate of each G7 economy based on information up to 2004. This is 
of course just the long term trend growth in the US, Canada and the UK. However, in 
Germany, France, Italy and Japan, the projected trend is below even the average (low) 
growth achieved in the 1990s. In the case of Italy, the projected trend is less than 1% 
per annum. 
In these circumstances, it is inevitable that forecasts will be biased, as forecasters 
in Germany, France, Italy and Japan learn about the new lower trend growth rate. This 
is consistent with the cross-country patterns of bias in our data. For example, the fall 
in trend growth in Japan happened earlier than in Europe, following the stock market 
crash in 1990, and forecasters now seem to have adapted to the new environment. In   16
Europe, most bias is observed in Germany and Italy, where trend growth has fallen 
further than in France.  
It is also possible that reliance on econometric methods makes it harder for 
forecasters to adapt, for two reasons. One is the underdevelopment of the supply side. 
In macroeconomic forecasting models, descriptions of aggregate demand are 
generally very rich, reflecting a well developed theory of demand, the ready 
availability of data on components of demand, and many observations of demand 
shocks in the form of policy changes, and exchange rate movements. However, trend 
growth is a supply-side phenomenon. Theories of growth are less well articulated. 
They rely on variables such as labour productivity, financial fragility and social 
capital, all of which are hard to measure. Oil prices are the only generalised supply 
side shock for which we have observations which are usable in a time series model, 
but even in this case it has proved hard to model the substitution effects that have 
diminished the impact of oil shocks over time. Changes in supply side conditions are 
therefore hard to account for in a conventional short term econometric model. A 
second problem is that many econometric models incorporate “error-correction” or 
“core model” features. These drive forecasts of growth and inflation to some 
underlying trend. Given that most models are parameterised using methods that give 
equal weight to all past observations, this trend will reflect some average relationship 
between aggregate supply and its determinants observed over the past several 
decades. As Clements and Hendry (2003) point out, if structural changes affecting the 
trend are occurring, the error correction feature will slow the rate of adaptation 
relative to simpler models without error correction features.  
 
3.2 Bias in individual forecasts 
In addition to bias in the consensus forecasts, there may also be biases at the level 
of the individual forecaster, in the sense that particular forecasters may tend to make 
predictions that are persistently higher or lower than the consensus. 
O’Brien (1990) tests for significant differences in the accuracy of a panel of 
investment analysts by running the fixed effects model: 
   17
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. + εit,T ,  (8) 
where y is the target variable and f the forecast, so that the dependent variable is the 
absolute forecast error.  IDi is a dummy taking the value 1 for a forecast made by 
forecaster i in a total panel of M forecasters, and YRT is a dummy taking the value 1 
for forecasts made for the target year T in the total sample of N target years. The 
coefficients ai measure “forecaster effects” and the coefficients cT “year effects” on 
forecast accuracy. The coefficient a0 is set to the mean error, so a significant positive 
value for ai would indicate a forecaster who was consistently less accurate than 
average, and vice versa.  
An analogous method can be used to test for bias, using 
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where the dependent variable is simply the forecast error, and the coefficients bi 
measure forecaster-effects on the error. With b0 set to the average bias, a significant 
positive value for bi would indicate a forecaster who was consistently more 
pessimistic than average, and vice versa.  
Assuming independent and identically distributed errors εit,T (ηit,T), the hypothesis 
that there is no significant difference in accuracy across forecasters (or a subgroup of 
forecasters) can be tested by testing for equality across the coefficients bi for all 
forecasters (or the subgroup), using a conventional F-test. In the context of our data, 
three econometric issues arise. First, the errors in (8) and (9) are bound to fall as the 
forecast horizon shortens, so pooling data across horizons is problematical. We 
therefore conduct tests separately on each forecast horizon. Second, in the case of 
forecasts with horizons greater than 12 months, there is liable to be correlation in the 
residuals due to fact that periods covered by successive forecasts overlap. We have 
therefore estimated the parameters of (8) and (9) and their standard errors on the 
assumption that residuals will follow an appropriate moving average process, namely 
εit,T  ~ MA{max(0, T - t - 12)}, and similarly for ηit,T.    18
Third, in addition to these complications, the distribution of εit,T  is certainly non-
normal, and that of ηit,T possibly non-normal, so the assumptions underlying the use 
of the F-test are violated. For this reason, Batchelor and Dua (1990b) use the 
nonparametric Friedman (1937) analysis of variance by ranks to test for significant 
differences in accuracy and bias. Skillings and Mack (1981) generalise this test to an 
unbalanced panel as follows. Let Rit,T be the rank of forecaster i in the survey at time t 
made for forecasts with target date T, with Nt forecasters participating in the survey. 
The normalised rank of forecaster i in this survey is  
 


























We write the sum of ranks over a set of surveys with a common horizon h = T-t as rih, 
and the vector of these sums for the first N-1 forecasters as rh = [ r1h, r2h, …rN-1h]. To 
adjust for the fact that each forecaster pair is not present in every survey we construct 
an (N-1) x (N-1) weighting matrix V with diagonal entries = -mih, the number of 
surveys where forecaster i makes an h-period forecast, and off-diagonal entries Mijh , 
the number of surveys where both i and j make forecasts. Then rh′V
-1rh ~ χ
2 (N-1) 
under the null hypothesis that the ranks are equal across forecasters. In the case of 
forecasts with horizons above 12 months, the overlapping forecast periods mean that 
the ranks from successive surveys are not independent. For these cases we report the 
average values of tests statistics from all non-overlapping subsets of our data. 
Ashiya (2006) applies this to testing for differences in accuracy and bias in a large 
panel of Japanese economic forecasts in the years 1981-2003, a much longer run of 
data than in previous studies. He finds that the results from the nonparametric method 
are very similar to those from fixed effects regressions. Both confirm the presence of 
persistent biases to optimism or pessimism by individual panellists.   
We have conducted exhaustive experiments using the 2 hypotheses x 2 tests x 7 
countries x 24 horizons x 2 variables. Because the test statistics have a clear pattern, 
we do not show them all exhaustively. Table 3 sets out results relating to differences   19
in accuracy and differences in optimism, from the fixed effects regression for all 
countries for 12-month ahead forecasts of growth and inflation. These results are 
typical of findings at all but the very shortest horizons.  The F-tests for equality of 
coefficients are conducted for “regular” forecasters, who made predictions in at least 
40% of the relevant surveys. The second column of Table 3 shows the numbers of 
regular forecasters in each country, ranging from 14 for Canada and 15 for Italy up to 
30 for the US and 38 for the UK.   
The hypothesis that these forecasters do not differ in their mean absolute error 
cannot be rejected at the 5% level except in two quite marginal cases. The test 
statistics are just significant for the GDP forecasts in France (p-value = .0517), and 
the inflation forecasts in Canada (p = .0741). Overall there is little evidence that some 
forecasters are more accurate than others.  
The hypothesis that forecasters do not differ with respect to biases toward 
optimism or pessimism is very strongly rejected for the real growth forecasts in all 
countries. The hypothesis is also rejected for the inflation forecasts in all countries 
except the UK, where there is no evidence of individual bias in inflation forecasts.  
Table 4 reports results for tests on the 12-month horizon forecasts using the 
Skillings-Mack (1981) non-parametric test. Although the p-values are somewhat 
higher than in the case of the F-tests, the inferences to be drawn are exactly the same. 
To establish when biases arise, and whether they are eliminated over time, Table 5 
shows the F-statistics by selected horizons for one country, the US. Other countries 
exhibit similar characteristics. There is little evidence of individual differences in 
accuracy of real growth forecasts even in the 24-month ahead forecast series. 
However, statistically significant biases toward optimism and pessimism are present 
at the longest horizons, and, surprisingly, tend to persist even down to very short 3- to 
1-month horizons, when the range of forecasts across individuals is small. With 
respect to inflation forecasts, there is less consistency. In the US, there are significant 
differences in accuracy and in optimism at most horizons. However, in some surveys 
the hypothesis of no differences cannot be rejected, and the differences tend to 
disappear as the horizon shortens.   20
 
4.  Concluding Comments 
 
This paper has documented the presence of systematic bias in the real GDP 
forecasts – and to a lesser extent the inflation forecasts – of private sector forecasters 
in the G7 economies in the years 1990-2005. The data come from the monthly 
Consensus Economics forecasting service, and bias is measured and tested for 
significance using parametric fixed effect panel regressions and nonparametric tests of 
accuracy ranks. The patterns across countries and forecasters give some clue as to 
whether bias reflects the inefficient use of information, or whether it reflects a rational 
response to financial, reputational and other incentives operating on forecasters.  
In several G7 countries – Japan, Italy, Germany, France – there is evidence of a 
bias in the consensus forecast for real GDP growth. We do not interpret this as a 
symptom of irrationality. Nor can it reflect political bias, since the forecasts come 
from a variety of sources, all private sector, and with no political reason to manipulate 
their forecasts. Some may have preferences for or against the party in government, but 
political biases should cancel out in the consensus forecasts. The most compelling 
explanation for optimism is that it reflects a rational adaptation of forecasts to the 
falling in the trend growth rate in these countries. In these circumstances, standard 
tests for rationality are inappropriate, and a bias towards optimism in the consensus 
forecast is inevitable as rational forecasters learn about the new trend. The fact that 
the same bias is not observed in the US, Canada and the UK, where trend growth has 
not fallen, also supports this hypothesis. 
This kind of bias is shared by all forecasters. However, we also find persistent 
individual biases, again mainly in real GDP forecasts. Specifically, forecasters seem 
to start their forecasting round by adopting a relatively optimistic or pessimistic view 
of growth. Forecasters who start optimistic one year also start off being optimistic in 
other years. These biases persist throughout the forecasting cycle, as more 
information about the target variable, and the forecasts of other forecasters, arrives. 
Even at short horizons, less than 3 months, rankings by optimism seem to be 
preserved.    21
The persistent optimism of some forecasters, and the persistent pessimism of 
others, is not consistent with the predictions of models of “rational bias” that have 
become popular in the finance and economics literature. These models predict that 
forecasters will move their initial forecasts away from the consensus to achieve 
certain objectives. However, there is nothing in the theory to explain why an 
individual forecaster would repeatedly seek to publish an initial forecast that is, say, 
higher than the consensus. The initial forecast in these theories is determined 
arbitrarily by the news available to each forecaster, and will be randomly above or 
below the initial consensus. Our explanation is that since the product of a forecaster is 
a number, the only way to differentiate that product is to make the number high or 
low. Forecasters thereby cultivate a reputation as optimists or pessimists. The extent 
to which this is possible without compromising accuracy depends on how noisy the 
target variable is. The forecasters in the Consensus Forecasts service seem to have 
judged this well. Or perhaps only forecasters who manage the tradeoff between 
accuracy and publicity well survive to become regular contributors to Consensus 
economics. Although there are clear differences among forecasters when ranked by 
optimism and pessimism, there are no significant differences among their accuracy 
ranks.   22
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Table 1 Bias in Consensus Forecasts of growth and inflation 
 
US Canada UK Germany France Italy Japan
Average growth rate 2.67 2.35 1.95 1.73 1.89 1.35 1.59
Standard deviation 1.60 1.74 1.64 1.65 1.20 0.97 2.03
Bias in Consensus
24-month 0.04 -0.55 -0.38 -0.96 -0.85 -1.24 -0.72
t-stat 0.11 -1.40 -1.06 -2.53 -2.46 -4.22 -1.25
18 month 0.01 -0.59 -0.46 -0.77 -0.74 -1.06 -0.37
t-stat 0.02 -1.45 -1.15 -2.03 -1.98 -3.84 -0.65
12-month 0.14 -0.30 -0.18 -0.22 -0.31 -0.63 0.24
t-stat 0.46 -0.83 -0.63 -0.88 -1.16 -3.33 0.61
6-month -0.13 -0.17 0.08 0.10 -0.10 -0.23 0.08
t-stat -0.72 -1.00 0.57 0.67 -0.72 -1.87 0.32
US Canada UK Germany France Italy Japan
Average inflation rate 2.86 2.27 3.25 2.15 3.29 2.69 -0.67
Standard deviation 0.96 1.37 2.01 1.08 1.02 2.23 1.52
Bias in Consensus Inflation forecasts
24-month -0.05 0.03 0.15 0.02 -0.13 0.20 0.02
t-stat -0.32 0.26 0.47 0.11 -0.91 0.70 0.11
18 month -0.06 0.02 -0.16 -0.02 -0.08 -0.12 -0.06
t-stat -0.54 0.12 -0.69 -0.19 -0.59 -0.49 -0.46
12-month -0.03 0.07 0.11 -0.19 -0.19 -0.07 0.04
t-stat -0.22 0.47 0.31 -1.50 -1.26 -0.26 0.27
6-month 0.08 0.12 0.25 -0.17 -0.03 0.21 0.07
t-stat 0.73 1.00 1.09 -1.23 -0.23 1.06 0.46
 
Data source: Consensus Forecasts monthly service, 1989-2004. Figures are percent 
per annum. Figures in italics are t-statistics testing the null hypothesis that the forecast 
bias is zero.    27
Table 2 The growth slowdown in Europe and Japan 
 
 
US Canada UK Germany France Italy Japan
Average annual growth rates
1960-70 4 . 25 . 33 . 04 . 55 . 45 . 7 1 0 . 1
1970-80 3 . 24 . 32 . 02 . 83 . 33 . 64 . 5
1980-90 3 . 32 . 82 . 62 . 32 . 42 . 33 . 9
1990-00 3 . 32 . 92 . 41 . 71 . 91 . 61 . 4
2000-05 2 . 72 . 62 . 40 . 61 . 50 . 51 . 1
Exponential smoothing model parameters and forecasts
lambda (λ ) 0.00 0.20 0.00 0.16 0.47 0.20 0.48
projected trend  3.32 2.96 2.69 1.22 1.61 0.90 1.62
 
 
Data source: OECD. Growth figures are percent per annum. Lambda is the parameter 
of the single exponential smoothing model of Equation (6), f*t, t+1 = λ yt +  (1- λ) f*t-1, 
t where yt is growth rate in year t, and f*t, t+1 is the forecast of the underlying growth 
rate made in year t for the year t+1 (and all subsequent years).   28
 
Table 3 Tests for differences in accuracy and optimism among individual 
forecasters, in all G7 countries, for a 12-month horizon: F-tests 
 
 
Country No. of Absolute Errors Errors
Forecasters F-statistic P-value F-statistic P-value
Real GDP:
US 30 0.71 0.8171 3.19 0.0000
CA 14 0.67 0.8003 2.12 0.0125
UK 38 0.87 0.6904 2.35 0.0000
GE 28 0.69 0.8778 3.46 0.0000
FR 22 1.07 0.3797 1.59 0.0517
IT 15 1.28 0.2193 2.01 0.0178
JP 20 1.28 0.1966 1.95 0.0103
Consumer Price Inflation:
US 30 1.40 0.1191 2.62 0.0002
CA 14 1.44 0.1392 1.63 0.0741
UK 38 2.22 0.0001 1.91 0.0016
GE 28 1.48 0.0566 3.61 0.0000
FR 22 1.32 0.1592 2.42 0.0007
IT 15 0.89 0.5811 3.28 0.0001
JP 20 0.97 0.5013 1.80 0.0215
  
 
F-statistics are tests of the constraints that the coefficients on forecaster effects are 
equal in the fixed effects regressions (8) and (9), for regular forecasters making 
forecasts in more than 40% of the relevant Consensus Forecasts surveys. P-values 
below 0.05 indicate statistically significant differences in accuracy or bias at the 5% 
level.   29
Table 4 Tests for differences in accuracy and optimism among individual 
forecasters in all G7 countries, for the 12-month horizon: the Skillings-Mack χ
2 test 
 
Country No. of Absolute Errors Errors
Forecasters χ2 (Ν−1) P-value χ2 (Ν−1) P-value
Real GDP:
US 72 59.49 0.8332 110.53 0.0019
CA 38 29.15 0.8178 57.56 0.0168
UK 74 66.22 0.6999 99.50 0.0213
GE 52 36.65 0.9349 76.53 0.0119
FR 48 47.31 0.4600 61.79 0.0726
IT 43 48.30 0.2335 60.71 0.0308
JP 56 63.71 0.1969 75.53 0.0346
Consumer Price Inflation:
US 72 83.47 0.1477 94.06 0.0350
CA 38 43.67 0.2091 47.16 0.1224
UK 74 106.16 0.0068 101.13 0.0163
GE 52 64.39 0.0986 70.66 0.0355
FR 48 54.96 0.1987 64.40 0.0467
IT 43 39.45 0.5835 63.71 0.0169




2 statistics are Skillings-Mack test statistics for significant differences in the 
accuracy and error ranks of forecasters for all forecasters in the relevant Consensus 
Forecasts surveys. P-values below 0.05 indicate statistically significant differences in 
accuracy or bias at the 5% level. 
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Table 5 Tests for differences in accuracy and optimism among individual 
forecasters in the United States, by horizon: F-tests 
 
 
Horizon Errors Absolute Errors
(months) F-statistic p-value F-statistic p-value
Real growth
24 2.40 0.0010 1.04 0.4122
18 3.94 0.0000 0.51 0.9621
12 3.19 0.0000 0.71 0.8171
6 2.00 0.0074 0.63 0.8913
3 2.68 0.0002 0.72 0.8024
1 0.83 0.6770 1.13 0.3169
Consumer price inflation
24 6.14 0.0000 3.29 0.0000
18 3.94 0.0000 2.43 0.0008
12 2.62 0.0002 1.40 0.1191
6 1.24 0.2202 1.48 0.0883
3 2.37 0.0010 2.96 0.0000
1 0.62 0.8986 1.05 0.3993
 
 
F-statistics are tests of the constraints that the coefficients on forecaster effects are 
equal in the fixed effects regressions (8) and (9), for regular forecasters making 
forecasts in more than 40% of the relevant Consensus Forecasts surveys. P-values 
below 0.05 indicate statistically significant differences in accuracy or bias at the 5% 
level.   31
 




The dotted lines connect average monthly analyst forecasts for earnings aggregated 
over the S&P500 companies for each target year in the period 1990-2006. Each month 
forecasts are made for the current year and the following year, giving a series of 24 
forecasts for each target year. Source: Thomson Financial, Oak Associates 
(www.yardeni.com). 
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The lines connect the series of monthly Consensus Forecasts for real GDP growth in 
Italy in each of the target years 1989-2004, and circles show the outcome. Each month 
forecasts are made for the current year and the following year. Source: Consensus 
Forecasts, monthly, 1989-2004.      
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